We provide a new experimental investigation of the neutrality theorem of Warr (1983), who states "when a single public good is provided at positive levels by private individuals, its provision is unaffected by a redistribution of income". Instead of comparing different income distributions across groups as Chan et al. (1996) , in our experiment the total group endowment is redistributed after a 10 rounds sequence. We compare an unequalizing redistribution (EI) and an equalizing redistribution (IE), to two benchmark treatments for which the 10 rounds sequence is repeated, either with an equal distribution (EE) or an unequal distribution (II).
1 Introduction the private consumption and G = n i=1 w i − x i is the consumption of the public good. The individual budget constraint is w i = x i + g i where g i represents the contribution to the public good for the i's individual. The equilibrium strategy is then given by g i = max(
This model predicts that rich players contribute more than poor players, that "very poor" players contribute zero, and therefore a redistribution from very poor to rich increases the level of the public good. If all players contribute a positive amount before and after the redistribution, the level of the public good will be unaffected by redistribution.
Besides the coordination issue already mentioned, the model predicts an "extreme" equilibrium in the high inequality treatment: only the rich player should contribute. Instead of playing Nash, the rich subject might have felt a moral obligation to contribute with respect to the "very poor" subjects.
In order to overcome the coordination problem due to multiple equilibria in individual contributions, and to allow for a direct test of redistribution, in the spirit of Warr (1983) and BBV (1986) we introduce a new experimental design. First, our design is based on a quadratic payoff function which implies a unique dominant strategies equilibrium (Keser, 1996) . Under suitable restrictions only interior solutions exist for a wide range of incomes.
Therefore the solutions are clearly independent from income, which establishes directly Warr's result. Second, we introduced a within-subject design, for which each subject is confronted to two income distributions. This is done by letting each group play two sequences of 10 rounds. After the first sequence, income is redistributed. This setting allows us to study the effect of income redistribution within each group, and to identify the reaction of subjects who become poorer or richer. Furthermore, we consider two kinds of redistributions: unequalizing redistribution and equalizing redistribution. In the first case the group starts with equal endowments in the first sequence and an unequal distribution is introduced in the second sequence. The equalizing redistribution starts with an unequal distribution in sequence 1 and introduces a uniform distribution in the second sequence.
The comparison of these treatments to the two benchmark treatments (two sequences with uniform income distribution and two sequences with unequal distributions) allows us to isolate the effect of the ordering of the sequences. Finally the benchmark treatments allow us to wipe out the restart effect (Andreoni, 1988 , Croson, 1996 that might be involved when a new sequence is started.
Our main findings are that redistribution does not affect the average amount of public good provided, that subjects tend to under-react to redistribution and that poor tend to over-contribute with respect to their Nash-contribution while rich either contribute their Nash level or slightly under-contribute.
The rest of the paper is organized as followed. In section 2 we present the theoretical models of Warr (1983) and Bergstrom, Blum and Varian (1986) and their testable propositions. In section 3 we introduce our experimental design and in section 4 we present the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The neutrality theorem of Warr (1983) and the extensions of Bergstrom, Blum and Varian (1986) Two fundamental papers deal with the effect of a redistribution of income on the voluntary contribution to a public good. At first, Warr (1983) concludes in a quite general model that when a single public good is privately provided at positive levels by each individual, an infinitesimal redistribution of income lets unchanged the private provision of the public good. On the base of this model, Bergstrom, Blum and Varian (1986) redemonstrate this result with non-infinitesimal variations of income and extend it to more than one public good. They also derive some interesting results when the redistribution of income is large enough to modify the initial set of contributors. Particularly, they show at a theoretical level that a redistribution of income from poor individuals to rich individuals will increase the private provision of the public good if the poor individuals are not contributors before the redistribution.
2.1
The neutrality theorem of Warr (1983) In 1983, P. G. Warr shows that "[w]hen a single public good is provided at positive levels by private individuals, its provision is unaffected by a redistribution of income". This result holds despite heterogeneity of agents in terms of individual preferences and marginal propensities to contribute to the public good.
Warr's result applies when "individuals behave as atomistic utility maximizers in the determination of their provision of a single public good, and where this results in an interior solution to their utility maximization problem". We schematically expose the basic hypotheses of this model in order to prepare our experimental design. The model holds for n consumers and m private goods. There is only one public good, noted g = n i=1 g i where g i is the private contribution to the public good of agent i. Warr uses utility functions
) that may differ among agents but are strictly quasi-concave, twice differentiable and increasing in all arguments. y i represents the exogenous income for each individual.
p is the vector of private goods prices and q is the price of the public good. In this model, each individual behaves as a utility maximizing competitor. One of the most important point is that the public good is provided at a positive level by each individual. The solution of the maximization program of an individual is finally an interior solution.
The equilibrium that emerges is classically sub-optimal e.g. the level of public good provision is inferior to the Pareto-optimal level. Warr studies then the effect of a redistribution of income on this equilibrium.
Warr finds that the aggregate demand function for the public good depends on p, q and y, respectively the vector of prices of the private goods, the price of the public good and the aggregate income. In conclusion of this, the aggregate demand function for public good is independent of a redistribution of income that leaves the aggregate income y unchanged. In the same way, the aggregate demand function for private goods depends on the same arguments p, q and y that leads to the same conclusion for private goods demand: the redistribution of income between individuals lets unchanged the aggregate demand for private goods. The intuition of the model is that a pure redistribution that lets unchanged the aggregate level of income does not affect the demand for the public good and consequently it does not affect neither the price of the public good nor relative prices (public/private). This ensure that demands for private goods are unchanged and because the supply is constant ceteris paribus, no price of private goods is affected. Consequently, the equilibrium provision of the public good is independent of the distribution of income. At the individual level, " [t] he effect that a pure redistribution has on each individual is absorbed entirely by adjustments to his expenditure on the public good."
This result is still conditioned by the fact that each individual is initially contributor and consume at least one private good. The result does not apply to more than one privately provided public good. Bergstrom, Blum and Varian (1986) consequently extend the model of Warr to more than one public good and to non-infinitesimal endowment variations. They also consider the effects of a redistribution of income on the provision of a public good when the set of contributor changes with the redistribution.
The Bergstrom, Blume and Varian model (1986)
The BBV model redemonstrates Warr's result and extends it to more than one public good. It also addresses the issue of the moving size of the contributors set when a redistribution of income occurs. However they do not introduce the fact that individuals may be concerned also by the amount of there own contribution in addition to the aggregate supply of the public good. The extensions of the model address the problem of the stability of the set of contributors when the income is redistributed. Warr's result needs this stability but in fact it is possible that some contributors stop their provision or new contributors appear when a redistribution is implemented. Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) consider a model quite close to Warr. The major new hypothesis of the theorem of neutrality is that the redistribution of income among the contributing consumers do not lead -at individual level-to losses larger than original contribution for each consumer. If this is respected and consumers have convex preferences, "each consumer consumes the same amount of the public good and the private good that he did before the redistribution". Moreover, they show that " [i] t is possible to extend the result" to a public good that is a function of the individual contribution, "to more general solution concepts than that of Nash equilibrium" and "to more than one public good ".
They only insist on one restriction on this neutrality result. "The result is sensitive to the assumption that utility depends only on private consumption and the amount of the public good ". If we introduce other arguments, the neutrality theorem will not apply for all functional forms of the utility.
3 The experimental design
The game
The constituent game of the experiment is the same that the one in Keser (1996) . There are four players, and each group of four players receives 80 tokens to invest. These 80 tokens are distributed between the four players in an egalitarian (20 tokens per player) or inegalitarian way (two players receive 15 tokens and two players receive 25 tokens).
They have to invest their tokens in an individual account and in a collective account.
Each token has to be invested during each repetition of the constituent game. There are 20 repetitions of the constituent game but the last 10 repetitions are not announced to the players at the beginning of the experiment. We made a redistribution of the tokens within the groups after 10 repetitions. The redistribution is not announced at the beginning of the experiment. In this way, we avoid different anticipation biases related to the player's endowment after the redistribution, like pessimism or optimism that may change the incentives to invest in the collective account. However, we are conscious that a restart effect may exist (Andreoni, 1988 (Andreoni, , 1995 when a non-announced restart of the 10 repetitions of the constituent game is made. To control it, we made two benchmark treatments of 20 repetitions (10 periods announced and 10 surprised new periods) without any redistribution of income and with an egalitarian or inegalitarian repartition of the tokens initially. We are consequently able to identify the restart effect and the effect of the redistribution.
The restart effect in the litterature
This effect was first studied by Andreoni (1988) to isolate the learning hypothesis to explain the decay of the contributions during the game. He made a standard public good experiment with partner and stranger treatments, with Nash equilibrium at 0. The players are told that they will play 10 periods. At the end of this sequence of ten periods, they are told that there is enough time to play another game of 10 periods. The game restarts for 10 periods. In reality, there was only 3 restart periods because of experiment budgetary restrictions. Croson (1996) replicated exactly the experiment of Andreoni.
Both have almost the same results: there is a restart effect in both partner and stranger treatment, but not in the same proportions. Andreoni found that individuals in the stranger treatment contribute more at the 11 th period than at the 10 th , but this effect is temporary. For the the partner treatment, he found that this effect is stronger and that the contributions at the 11 th period mirror the contributions at the first period, and the contributions did not fall so quickly as for the strangers. The results of Croson (1996) are almost the same: the restart effect is present in the partner treatment and present but insignificant in the stranger treatment. These results are not so important for our study, but we have to keep in mind the presence of a such effect. To define it more precisely, we can mention the definition given by Croson: the restart effect is when the contributions increase sharply from the last round of the original game to the first round of the restart game.
Precisions on treatments
In order to avoid multiple equilibrium problems like in Chan et al. (1996) , we use a quadratic payoff function, following Keser (1996) :
where x i represents the investment in the private account and g i the investment in the collective account.
This function has a unique interior Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies in g i = 2
when ω i = 15, in g i = 7 when ω i = 20 and in g i = 12 when ω i = 25. The equilibrium contribution of each individual depends only on his individual endowment.
To test the neutrality theorem, we have implemented four treatments of two sequences of 10 repetitions of the constituent game. We make two benchmark treatments without redistribution to isolate the restart effect: with an egalitarian repartition of the tokens and with an inegalitarian repartition of the tokens. Then we make two treatments where a redistribution of the tokens within the players is implemented. A non-announced (in)equalizing redistribution is made after the first ten periods sequence.
The repartition of the tokens is common knowledge. Contrary to the litterature on the restart effect, we randomly pay to the subjects one of the two sequences of ten periods to avoid wealth effects after the first ten repetitions of the constituent game.
To eliminate the restart effect, we compare the benchmark treatments without redistribution named Equality-Equality (EE) and Inequality-Inequality (II) treatments to the treatments named Equality-Inequality (EI) and Inequality-Equality (IE) detailed in table 1.
[ Information in the game is the following. Endowments are public information: inequality or equality in a group is known by individuals.
Results
We conducted the experiments in a computerized laboratory in the Université de Montpellier 1, with the software z-Tree (Fischbascher, 2007) . We made 7 sessions of 16 subjects and 2 sessions of 8 subjects. The 128 subjects were randomly selected among a set of more than 1 000 volunteer students of the Universities of Montpellier. Subjects were given instructions for the first ten periods. They were randomly assigned to a group of 4 persons. Groups remain unchanged during the whole session, including the second sequence of ten periods. Subjects were told to invest their tokens in a private account and/or in a public account for each of the ten periods. After the tenth period is achieved, new instructions were distributed to the subjects to explain the conditions of the repetition of a new sequence of ten periods. This new sequence of ten periods was not announced to the subjects at the beginning of the experiment but was only announced after the first sequence is completed. We emphasized the elements which changed for the ten last periods (namely the group income repartition when a redistribution is made, and nothing for the benchmark treatments), so that the subjects understand well the mechanism of the redistribution.
For the analysis, we have eight independent data for each treatment (table 2) . Our tests are two-sided tests if non specified.
[ Table 2 about here.]
A global insight of our data is given by figures 1 to 4 that describe the average contributions for each treatment according to endowments. Our data analysis leads to two types of results (at the collective level and at the individual level) that are described and discussed in the following subsections.
[ Proof. Before testing the potential effect of the redistribution, we made some classical preliminary tests 4 on our data to test the samples' homogeneity. We made a MannWithney test but only on the first sequence of ten periods of each treatment. No significant difference was found between the first ten periods of the treatment (EI) and the first ten periods of its benchmark (EE) (p-value = 0.7525) and also no significant difference was found between the first ten periods of the treatment (IE) and the first ten periods of its benchmark (II) (p-value = 0.3282). We can consequently test the within-subjects redistribution effect. We consequently group the data of the first ten periods of the treatments (EE) and (EI) and the data of the first ten periods of the treatments (IE) and (II), and we test if there is no significant difference between the treatments with equality and the treatments with inequality. The test shows that there is no significant difference (p-value = 0.8505) between the mean contributions when there is an equal repartition of income and the mean contributions when there is an unequal repartition of income during the first ten periods. These results are consistent with Chan et al. (1996) .
When testing the potential effect of the redistribution, the experimental results do not infirm the neutrality theorem of Warr at the collective level. To isolate the redistribution effect, we just have to compare the second sequences from the treatments having the same first sequences. Indeed, if a restart effect exists, it is present in both treatments, so the above comparison analyses the redistribution effect only. The results in table 3 illustrate the neutrality of the redistribution at the collective level as predicted by Warr.
[ = 0.3828), implying also that the redistribution has no effect on the collective contribution to the public good. The result of Warr is not also here infirmed at the collective level.
Discussion. We obtain the same result as Chan et al. (1996) in the comparison of groups of subjects with identical aggregate income but with a different income distribution.
But contrary to Chan et al., our design is able to test the neutrality theorem of Warr with a real redistribution of income implemented. When the set of theoretical contributors is invariant before and after a redistribution of income, an (un)equalizing redistribution is neutral on the provision of a unique public good. This corroborates the theoretical neutrality result of Warr (1983) at the collective level. However, at the individual level, our following results show that individuals do not conform to Warr's predictions even if
there is neutrality at the collective level.
Indeed, Warr's theorem says that the individual consumption of the private good is invariant when a redistribution of income occurs. Consequently, it is only the provision of the public good that is affected by a redistribution of income at the individual level. But our results are not consistent with these predictions. We find that the subjects globally under-react to the redistribution at the individual level. Moreover, we observe that the richer subjects Nash-contribute whereas the poorer subjects over-contribute to the public good.
At the individual level
When studying the individual behavior in relation to the redistribution, we observe the following facts.
Result 2.a. Subjects individually and significatively over-contribute in the egalitarian parts of the treatments.
Result 2.b. In the inegalitarian parts of the treatments, the poorer subjects significatively over-contribute and the richer subjects significatively Nash-contribute.
Proof. We made a Wilcoxon test to study the potential over/under-contribution 5 of individuals and find the p-values and consequences reported in table 4.
[ Table 4 about here.]
Like in a majority of public goods experiments (see Laury, Walker and Williams (1999) and Holt and Laury (1998) ), subjects significatively over-contribute to the public good in the egalitarian treatment (EE), in the first (egalitarian) part of the treatment (EI), and in the the second (egalitarian) part of the treatment (IE). However, this over-contribution 5 A good measure of it is:
where g i is the contribution to the public good of i's individual, w i is the endowment of i's individual, g * i is the Nash-contribution to the public good of i's individual (Willinger, Ziegelmeyer, 2001 ). In our design, the denominator is constant for each individual: w i − g * i = 13, ∀i, so we indifferently use g i − g * i as a measure of the over/under-contribution.
after an equalizing redistribution (IE) is the only fact of the over-contribution of the former poor individuals (p-value = 0.008496) because the former rich individuals tend to Nash-contribute after this type of redistribution (p-value = 0.9794). In the inegalitarian treatments or inegalitarian parts of the treatments, the poorer subjects systematically and significatively over-contribute to the public good whereas the richer subjects systematically and significatively Nash-contribute to the public good. Because this phenomenon of over/Nash-contribution is present in the treatment IE and in the treatment II, it is only due to the inequality of income and not due to an inequalizing redistribution of income (treatment EI).
Discussion. Result 2.a. is a classical result in public goods experiments. Individuals tend to over-contribute to the public good, that the equilibrium would be interior or not (see Keser (1996) , Laury, Walker and Williams (1999) and Holt and Laury (1998) 
among others).
Result 2.b. seems to be more surprising. Why rich subjects Nash-contribute while poor subjects continue to over-contribute? A possible explanation of this lies maybe in the strength of the social dilemma that applies to each type of individuals (Willinger & Zieglemeyer, 2001 ). In this paper, they experimentally show that when the social dilemma in a public goods experiment reduces (i.e. the Nash-equilibrium as a dominant strategy approaches the optimum), individuals tend to approach the Nash equilibrium. With similar parameters and experimental design (except the heterogeneity of income among groups), they find that over-contribution appears only when the social dilemma is high, i.e. when the Nash equilibrium is low. Even if we have this result with heterogeneity of income, the comparison with the results of Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (2001) is interesting for advancing an explanation of our data. In our experiment, poor subjects are facing to a very low Nash equilibrium ( 2 15 = 13.33% of their endowment) and they over-contribute whereas rich subjects are facing to a high Nash equilibrium at 12 (48% of their endowment) and they Nash-contribute. Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (2001) also find that the Anderson et al. (1998) logit equilibrium model predicts their data. This model combines altruism and decision errors, so explanations of our result have maybe to be found in these behaviors.
To see more precisely if our results can be explained by these findings, we can do the same test as in Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (2001) , but with our experimental design. Namely, we can replicate our experiment with different levels of Nash equilibrium for subjects, always with inequality of income distribution. We would be consequently able to increase or decrease the social dilemma and to see the evolution of the over-contribution of players.
Result 3. Subjects under-react to the redistribution (equalizing and unequalizing), i.e. they made insufficient adjustments to the redistribution.
In our analysis, we define the adjustment for each individual as the difference between his average contribution in the second sequence and his average contribution in the first sequence of the treatment. According to Warr's theorem, this adjustment has to be equal to the variation of income (+/ − 5 in our experiment).
Proof. We also made additional Wilcoxon tests on the individual contributions. Particularly, we find that the subjects under-react to the inequalizing redistribution of income.
Indeed, the subjects who become poorer have theoretically to make a 5-tokens-reduction of their contribution to the public good but they significatively reduce their contribution of less than 5 tokens (p-value = 0.0937 6 ), that leads to a over-contribution to the public good due to the redistribution. They reduce their contribution of 4.53 tokens on average but if we cut the individual that clearly overreacted to the redistribution, the mean reduction in contribution of the 15 last subjects is 4.11. In the same way, the subjects who become richer have theoretically to make a 5-tokens-increase of their contribution to the public good (the behavior of one type of subjects compensates the one of the other type, leading to the neutrality theorem at the collective level). However, they significatively increase their contribution of less than 5 tokens (p-value = 0.005029), that leads to a Nash-contribution to the public good of the richer subjects. They increase their contribution of only 2.53 tokens on average. Table 5 sums up the means of the individual contributions of treatment (EI) and evaluates the individual over or under-reaction to the redistribution (comparatively to the Nash reaction).
6 We eliminate 1 of the 16 players who clearly overreacted to the redistribution, that introduce a bias in the test. With all the players, the p-value is 0.2216 that does not allow us to conclude to an under-reaction of poor individuals.
[ Table 5 about here.]
In the same way, we find that the subjects under-react to the equalizing redistribution of income. In treatment (IE), the poorer subjects have theoretically to increase their contribution of 5 tokens whereas the richer subjects have to reduce their contribution of 5 tokens. However, there is also a significant under-reaction in comparison with the Nash reaction to the redistribution of each type of subjects. The poorer subjects increase their contribution of less than 5 tokens (p-value = 0.002090, +2.68 tokens on average) and the richer subjects reduce their contribution of less than 5 tokens (p-value = 0.007534, -3.71 tokens on average). Table 6 sums up the means of the individual contributions of treatment (IE) and evaluates the individual over or under-reaction to the redistribution.
[ Table 6 about here.]
There is a significant under-reaction of each type of individual (rich and poor). The neutrality result is consequently corroborated at the collective level because under-reactions of one type of subjects compensate under-reactions of the other type.
Discussion. An interpretation of this phenomenon could be found in an insufficient adjustment to the redistribution due to an anchoring effect. An anchor is an initial value used by individuals as a starting point in estimating or choosing a value. Kahneman and Tversky (1974) explain that this initial value used as a starting point to people's estimations exists in many situations. In our experiment, individuals probably use their initial endowment as anchor and continue to contribute after the redistribution with this value in mind. They consequently insufficiently adjust their contribution related to the new equilibrium conditioned by the new endowment they have to invest. Epley and Gilovich (2006) study the origins of these insufficient adjustments found in many situations. They conclude that individuals stop their adjustment when a satisfying or plausible value is reached. In this view, the anchor would be the level of contribution preceding the redistribution (e.g. the average contribution level of the ten first periods).
Result 4. Individual's under-reactions to the redistribution are asymmetric related to endowment's variation. The decrease of the contribution of individuals who become poorer is more important than the increase of the contribution of individuals who become richer.
Proof.
[ Table 7 about here.]
We made a one-sided Wilcoxon test by combining reactions of individuals having the same direction of variation of income. So we compare reactions of individuals who become poorer with reactions of individuals who become richer and we find a significant difference of reaction at 5% (p-value = 0.04528) implying that the decrease of contribution of individuals who become poorer after the redistribution is larger than the increase of contribution of individuals who become richer.
Discussion. We do not have any theoretical model explaining the asymmetric adjustments. We can only note that this asymmetry expresses that individuals privilege their private account after the redistribution. Indeed, individuals who become richer increase their contribution of a fewer amount than the reduction of contribution of individuals who become poorer.
The study of this phenomenon has to be an agenda for future research.
At the individual level, we have consequently two types of results: results independent from the redistribution and results dependent of it. The first ones are that rich players Nash-contribute and that poor players over-contribute independently of the redistribution.
The second ones are our major results because directly implicated by the redistribution:
under-reaction to the redistribution and asymmetry of this reaction. These last results are different from Warr's predictions at the individual level even if reactions are in the predicted direction. And the neutrality result at the collective level holds despite these differences, what requires to implement additional experiments.
Conclusion
In this paper, we experimentally investigate the neutrality theorem of Warr (1983) on the private provision of a public good. This theorem explains that a redistribution of income among contributors to a public good does not change the total contribution to this public good. We implemented an experimental framework that allows us to make a real redistribution of income during the experiment contrary to Chan et al. (1996) who only compare different cases of contribution where there is an inequality of income among subjects. We use a quadratic payoff function that ensures a unique interior Nash equilibrium. We are also able to control an eventual restart effect when we make a redistribution, effect that may corrupt the impact of the redistribution itself. With this design, we find that the neutrality theorem is not infirmed by our data at the collective level, in the sens that a redistribution of income among contributors does not significatively change the total contribution to the public good.
However at the individual level, we find that the poorer subjects significatively overcontribute to the public good, whereas the richer subjects Nash-contribute to the public good. The redistribution of income does not change this over/Nash-contribution because we find this result in the inegalitarian benchmark treatment where no redistribution was implemented. Consequently, the only inequality of income seems to explain this phenomenon, that is not the fact of the inequalizing redistribution. Moreover we observe that individuals significatively under-react to the redistribution, result that does not exist in Chan et al. because they did not make a real redistribution. The reason of this under-reaction (from both richer and poorer subjects) must be explored to understand why individuals do not adjust their contribution sufficiently after a redistribution. A phenomenon of anchoring (Kahneman et Tversky, 1974) leading to an insufficient adjustment of the contribution could explain this.
Finally, we observe an asymetric adjustment to the redistribution according to endowment's variations. This asymmetry expresses that individuals privilege their private account after the redistribution. Indeed, individuals who become richer increase their contribution of a fewer amount than the reduction of contribution of individuals who become poorer.
If we have only experimented the neutrality result of Warr (1983) in the paper, we can propose a complete experimental framework to test each proposition of the BBV model.
This framework allows to isolate the effect of the redistribution on the private provision to a public good by intra and inter-group comparisons. The experimentation of each proposition of the BBV model will be an major agenda for our future research. (20,20,20,20) 80=(15,15,25,25) Nash-contribution 28=(7,7,7,7) 28=(2,2,12,12) The redistribution is Inequalizing Equalizing Endowments after the redistribution (last ten periods)
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